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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The City has made unsupported statements that the ordinance at issue is constitutional on its 
face, and neither vague nor overbroad. They have not supported their arguments with reasoning or 
authority, simply contending that Defendants have not met their burden of proof on their 
constitutional attacks on the ordinance. 
Defendants have shown that the ordinance cannot simply be interpreted as the City requests, 
based on its text, and its history. The ordinance is either too vague on its face to be enforced, or it 
is subject to extrinsic evidence of meaning because of its lack of precision. There can be little doubt 
that the meaning has been changed by the City to suit its purpose, without warning. Any law subj ect 
to such elasticity must be subject to questions concerning whether it adequately warns the public as 
to the conduct which is prohibited. 
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The attacks made on the ordinance, both on its face, and as to its usage against these 
Defendants, are within the jurisdictiomof this Court for review. Defendants claim their rights to Due 
Process of Law have been violated. These are substantial and important rights which cannot be 
precluded from review by narrowing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLEE DOES NOT SUPPORT ITS ARGUMENT THAT THE ORDINANCE IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
The City argues that the ordinance at issue is not unconstitutionally vague, because it is 
"sufficiently clear to convey 'warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practices'". The vfery fact that the meaning has vacillated over a period of time 
supports the conclusion that it does not meet this standard. 
The City claims that Appellants have not carried their burden to show that the ordinance is 
unconstitutional, because they have not shown that the law allows enforcement "in a manner that 
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement". See State v. Kruegen 1999 UT App 
54, f 23, 975 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1999). Defendants have indeed met their burden on this point. 
It is only because this law lends itself to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement that Defendants 
are before this Court. Defendants provided affidavits to the trial court on the arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement, and attempted to introduce evidence on the point of trial. If they failed 
to prove their contentions adequately- it was because the Court wrongfully excluded the evidence. 
Defendants believe that this Court h^s before it sufficient facts and law to reverse the trial court 
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outright, and to dismiss the charges. In the alternative, this matter must be remanded to the trial 
court to hear the extrinsic evidence of meaning, and the historical context of the ordinance. Such 
a presentation will easily show that Defendants are correct about this ordinance being 
unconstitutionally vague. 
POINT II 
THE SUBJECT ORDINANCE IS A REGULATION OF EXPRESSION WHICH IS PROTECTED 
BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The City contends that the ordinance at issue regulates conduct, and not expression protected 
by the First Amendment. Their has been much litigation over the kind of adult entertainment 
regulated by so called "sexually oriented business" (SOB) ordinances. The United States Supreme 
Court has routinely ruled that nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment, and that regulation 
of it by the City is subject to increased scrutiny. See Schad v. Mount Ephraim. 452 U.S. 61 (1981), 
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres. Inc.475 U.S. 41 (1986), and City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.. 529 
U.S. 277 (2000). Though regulations have often been upheld, courts have uniformly used the 
"intermediate scrutiny" test enunciated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). That test 
requires satisfaction of a four parts, and is more demanding than the constitutional review of statutes 
or ordinances not affecting First Amendment rights. The instant section is part of a larger scheme 
to regulate what clearly is Constitutionally protected expression. Because this ordinance does 
infringe on constitutional rights to free expression, it is constitutionally overbroad. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS TO 
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DEFENDANTS AS WELL AS ISSUpS OF EVIDENCE AND INTERPRETATION 
Appellants, in their original brief, attacked the facial validity of the ordinance at issue in 
points II and IV. Appellee, in a five page brief, responds briefly to those points. Appellants, in Point 
III of their previous brief, claim that tne introduction of extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the 
law is necessary for it to be properly interpreted. Obviously, if the law cannot be reasonably 
interpreted, there is added fuel for the contention that it is unconstitutionally vague. Appellants 
maintain that this argument is an extension of, and a natural supplement to, their argument on the 
facial vagueness of the ordinance. In £oint IV of their brief, Appellants suggest that the twisted use 
of the law by the City, as endorsed! by the trial court, denies Due Process of Law. Both the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Utah guarantee Due Process of Law. In 
addition to Article I Section 7, the Constitution of Utah enhances that due process guarantee in 
Article I Section 11 which states, in ijelevant part: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course or law,... 
The former constitutional prdvision on appellate jurisdiction of cases originating injustice 
courts (Article VIII Section 9) has been repealed. Thus, it seems that rights guaranteed in Article 
I of the Constitution are the most direct on point. Appellants contend that the ordinance at issue is 
both invalid on its face and as applied to these Defendants. The due process arguments raised by 
Appellants involve basic rights of fundamental fairness as guaranteed by both the United States and 
Utah Constitutions. The doctrines s0t forth by the United States Supreme Court in Boie v. City of 
Colombia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), andRalevv.Ohio. 360 U.S. 423 (1959), are based on constitutional 
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protections afforded all citizens. Thus, the attacks made by Appellants on both the text and the use 
of this ordinance are all constitutional attacks. 
Appellees, however, assert that the only issue before this Court is the facial validity of the 
ordinance. In one brief paragraph, the City asserts that an appeal from a case originating in a justice 
court is severely limited in scope. The statute governing such appeals does not support the 
contention of Appellee. Section 78-5-120 (7) states simply: 
The decision of the district court is final and may not be appealed unless the district court 
rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. 
The statute contains a trigger granting jurisdiction to this court. If the district court rules on 
the constitutionality of an ordinance, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Section 78-
2a-3(2)(e) U.C.A. Nothing in the statute confines the appeal, or the jurisdiction of this Court, to a 
specific constitutional question. 
The City, without explanation, cites three cases in support of its position that this appeal is 
to be severely restricted. The first citation is to State v. Hinson. 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah App. 
1998). That case, on the cited page, contains the following statement: 
We further hold that, absent and issue regarding the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance, the decision of the district court is final and this court has no jurisdiction to hear 
an appeal thereof. 
That statement contains no support for the contention that, once this court obtains 
jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is restricted to a specific issue. The second citation is Dean v. Henriod. 
1999 UT App 50, 975 P.2d 946, 948 (Utah App. 1999). That case involved only the question of 
whether an extraordinary writ may issue from this court directing a district court to hear an appeal 
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de novo pursuant to Section 78-5-120 IjJ.C. A. This Court ruled that it does have jurisdiction to issue 
an extraordinary writ directing the district court to fully try the matter de novo. It noted that the 
district court abused its discretion in refusing to hear the case de novo; and a question of abuse of 
discretion could not ordinarily be appealed to this court, absent a constitutional question. Thus, the 
issuance of an extraordinary writ was the only remedy. There was no comment on whether this 
Court receives full jurisdiction to review the court below, once a constitutional issue is presented. 
The third case cited by the City Is City of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P.2d 513,517 (Utah 
1990). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the history of the provision limiting appeals 
in cases originating injustice courts. The Court, referring to an earlier version of §78-5-120 U.C.A., 
said "that statute restricted Supreme Court review of these de novo trials in district court to situations 
involving a challenge to a statute's validity or constitutionality. Obviously this appeal is such a 
"situation". The Supreme Court could easily have used the word "questions" instead of the word 
"situations" in that sentence. That one change of word would have restricted the scope of the appeal, 
rather than enumerating the specific trigger. It did not do so. Once again, nothing contained in that 
decision support s restricting the scopp of this appeal. The City's objection to this scope is not well 
taken. 
CONCLUSION 
The ordinance at issue is properly before this Court pursuant to a bona fide dispute on its 
constitutionality. The ordinance is both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and it has been 
applied to these Defendants in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The convictions should be 
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reversed. In the alternative, this matter should be remanded to the District Court for the admission 
of extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the ordinance. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of April, 2002. 
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